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NOTES

or whether due care was exercised. 19 But an exception to the general rule exists
where safety of the structure or appliance or method is such a technical matter
that the jury would be unable to make a determination itself, and in such a case
expert opinion may be admitted. 20 Even where an objection by defense counsel,
on grounds the testimony sought is an opinion, would be sustained, however, such
an objection would be detrimental. It takes little imagination to feature the reaction of a juror to defense counsel's objection to plaintiff's questioning an employee of defendant whether the appliance was safe.
It is true that an instruction will be given if requested that the evidence is
admissible only for impeachment purposes and for no other. 2 But admitting the
evidence and instructing the jury is not the same as keeping the evidence out altogether. If a juror has the information, it is difficult or impossible for him to restrict
its use entirely to the admissible purpose.
Thus it would seem advisable to restrict a plaintiff's right to impeach by evidence of subsequent precautions to cases where the defense has itself introduced
the evidence which is subject to impeachment or where the evidence was actually
volunteered by the plaintiff's witnesses testifying under section 2055. Such a restriction would be in accord with the social policy that long justified the rule
requiring the exclusion of such evidence. Has the Daggett case buried this policy
without acknowledging the fact of its death? Future cases alone will tell.
Helen Barrett
FUTURE INTERESTS--IMPLED CONDITION OF StRVIVAL
T dies, and in his will devises Blackacre "to B for life, remainder to B's children." At T's death B has one child, C. If C predeceases the life tenant, is his
interest transmissible to his successors, or does it terminate by reason of his failure
to survive? In other words, where the remainder is to go to the children of the
life tenant is the interest of such a child subject to the condition that he survive
the life tenant?
In California, as at common law, there is a presumption in favor of early vesting.1 What evidence is necessary to raise an implied condition of survival which
will rebut this presumption? The intent of the testator will control in the construction of any such clause. 2 But the difficulty lies in the fact that very often testators
fail to foresee the possibility that children will not survive their parents. In such
a case the courts are called upon to construe either a nonexistent or an ambiguously defined intent.
Such was the problem presented to the California Supreme Court in Estate of
Stanford,3 where it was necessary to construe one phase of the will of Jennie
Lathrop Stanford. It created a trust for the benefit of testatrix' niece, Amy L.
Hansen, for life, and "upon her death (the) trust shall cease" and the corpus
"shall belong and be delivered to the child or children of" Amy. Stanford University was named as the residuary legatee. At the time of the testatrix' death
19 CAL. JuR. 2d, Evidence § 361 (1954).
20 Bundy v. Sierra Lumber Co., 149 Cal. 772, 87 Pac. 622
21

(1906).

Hatfield v. Levy Brothers, 18 Cal. 2d 798, 117 P.2d 841 (1941).
1
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 28, 123.
2
Estate of Puett, 1 Cal. 2d 131, 33 P.2d 825 (1934).
3 49 Cal. 2d .
315 P.2d 681 (1957).
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Amy had one child, Walter. Amy and her son both survived the testatrix, but
Walter predeceased his mother, dying without issue and bequeathing his estate
to Ruth Barton. The court in a 4 to 3 decision reversing the Superior Court, Santa
Clara County, held that no condition of survival would be implied, and that,
therefore, Ruth Barton took as successor to Walter.
Both the majority and minority agreed that Walter's interest was subject to
partial divestment in the event of other children coming into existence. 4 But the
dissent felt that it was also subject to complete divestment by Walter's predeceasing his mother. In holding that Walter's interest was not so subject, the majority
expressly disapproved four earlier California cases, Estate of Blake,5 Estate of
Cavarly,6 Estate of Clark,7 and Estate of Hamon,8 wherein conditions of survival
had been implied in construing similar dispositions. The holding of the Stanford
case would seem to be correct and in accord with section 296 of the Restatement
of Property, which reads as follows:
"(2) From the fact that a class can increase in membership until a certain future
date, no inference should be made that only such members of the class as survive to
such future date become distributees." 9

The Clark and Cavarly cases, and also the dissent in the Stanford case, did
imply such a condition on the basis that the gift was to a class. In doing so the
court in the Cavarly case relied on a statement made in Gray on Perpetuities that
"it is a rule of construction of a gift to a class that only those are included who are
in the class at the time of distribution."'" As pointed out by Professor Ferrier,"
Gray made this statement in consideration of the problem as to when the class
closed so that after born members would not be allowed to qualify. In its proper
context the meaning of the quotation from Gray is merely that those not yet born
at the time of distribution will never share in the interest.
In the Stanford case the dissent falls prone to the same error of quoting out
of context. Quoting from Simes and Smith,' 2 the minority says:
"Where a gift to a class is postponed, so far as distribution is concerned, until the
termination of a prior life estate, it is clear that the general rule of construction would
permit the class to increase until the end of the life estate, but would exclude all
members of the class who were not in being at the termination of the life estate." 13
(Emphasis added)
4 After Walter's death, Amy Hansen adopted as her children, an adult and her two
children. The majority of the court held that they, also, became members of the class "child
or children." To reach this decision extrinsic evidence was admitted from which it appeared
that Jennie believed an adopted child would have the same rights as a natural child. The court
felt that this showed intent which would rebut the usual rule that such adoptees do not fall
within the class. The dissent felt that such evidence is an insufficient showing of intent to
abrogate the established rule. Annot., 144 A.L.R. 670, 676 (1943), 70 A.L.R. 621, 626 (1931).
5157 Cal. 448, 108 Pac. 287 (1910).
6 119 Cal. 406, 51 Pac. 629 (1897).
7 64 Cal. App. 2d 636, 149 P.2d 465 (1944).
8 136 Cal. App. 517, 29 P.2d 326 (1934).
9 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 296 (1940).
10 119 Cal. at 410, 51 Pac. at 630.
11 Ferrier, Implied Condition of Survivorship in Gifts of Future Interests in California,
40 CALir. L. Rav. 49, 58 (1952).
12 SimhES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS

la Id. at 78.

§ 640 (1956).
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Simes and Smith in the section from which this passage was quoted, were discussing the advisability of closing the class at the end of the life estate, and the reference, as was Gray's, was to those members not yet in being rather than to those
who did exist but died.
In addition, in the Clark and Cavarly cases the court failed to apply section
123 of the Probate Code, which reads as follows:
"A testamentary disposition to a class includes every person answering the description at the testator's death; but when the possession is postponed to a future
period, it includes all persons coming within the description before the time to which
possession is postponed."2' 4

While not conclusive on the problem, the first clause is a recognition of the rule in
favor of early vesting, and by implication would seem to negate any requirement
of survival to the time to which distribution is postponed. 15
Other early California cases appear to make a distinction between words of
gift which are said to pass a present interest and those which are deemed to be in
futuro. In the former instance the gift is said to be immediate, with postponement
only as to the time of possession. In the latter, a condition of survival is said to
be annexed to the substance of the gift.' 6 Estate of Blake is an illustration of the
application of this distinction. In this case there was no intermediate life estate.
The gift was in trust to pay the income to two daughters and a granddaughter until
each arrived at the age of thirty. Then "as each... arrives at the age of thirty,
she shall have the right to demand and receive one-third of the rest and residue
of my estate as her distributive share thereof." (Emphasis added.) One basis for
requiring survival to age thirty was that the right "to demand and receive" was
future, and therefore the gift was contingent on survival.
In Estate of Hamon the words were "shall deliver" the property at the expiration of twenty years, and survival to that time was held to be a condition precedent.
However, in three other California cases no condition of survival was found from
similar words. In Keating v. Smith17 the trust corpus was "to go to" the testator's
widow at the expiration of a period measured by the minority of the children; in
Estate of Wallace'8 the trustee "shall distribute" the trust property upon the
death of the life tenant; and in Estate of Norris9 the trustee "shall grant and
deliver" at the death of named persons. In these last three cases it was felt that
the words quoted referred merely to delivery of possession rather than passage of
title. Finding any apparent distinction between these phrases would appear to be
an arbitrary approach to discerning the testator's intent.
In the Stanford case the terms of the trust were couched in words similar to
those in the cases abovementioned. Here the will provided that upon the termination of the life estate the trust corpus "shall belong and be delivered to" the children of Jennie. The court properly found that this clause is no different from "go
to," the words in the Keating case. It concluded that such phrases have no technical meaning but are terms common in everyday usage which may refer to delivery of possession only, and are, therefore, not controlling in the determination as to
14 CAL. PROB. CoDE § 123.
15 See Ferrier, supra note 11, at

59.

16 Clobberie's Case, 2 Vent. 342 (1677).
17 154 Cal. 186, 97 Pac. 300 (1908).
18 11 Cal. 2d 338, 79 P.2d 1094 (1938).
19 28 Cal. App. 2d 152, 177 P.2d 299 (1947).

